in two forms, a right to safe drinking water and a right to sanitation. I support both. I talk of a human right to to refer to both rights, and distinguish between them where appropriate.
According to the WHO, each human being requires at least 20 liters of clean water for daily consumption and basic hygiene. 2 However, many countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East lack sufficient water resources or have so far failed to develop these resources or the necessary infrastructure. According to a 2006 UN Development Programme report, one part of the world sustains a designer bottled water market that generates no tangible health benefits, another part suffers acute public health risks because people have to drink water from 3 The world has met the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water, well in advance of the 2015 deadline. Nonetheless, insufficient access to clean water remains a ubiquitous problem, posing an impediment to development and may even be a security risk.
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The human rights framework is the leading proposal for a globally acceptable normative approach to regulating human affairs (Risse (2012b) , chapter 1). It matters therefore greatly 2 http://hdr.undp.org/external/hdr2006/water/10.htm. The 2006 Human Development Report provides much information on the global water crisis. See also the biennial report The World's Water by the Pacific Institute (edited by Peter Gleick, e.g., Gleick (2011)). On the overall water situation, see World Water Assessment Programme (2003) and (2009) . For the range of conceptual (legal) and practical issues connected to a human right to water, see Dubreuil (2006) . Water is vital as a solvent and an essential part of a multitude of metabolic processes within the body. own bodies. For historical approaches to water regulation across cultures, see Salzman (2006) . For historical and contemporary water conflicts, see also Shiva (2002) .
3 http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf, p 35. Most water is used for agriculture (upwards of 70%) followed by industry (15-20%) and personal consumption (10-15%), of which drinking water is a fraction. Arguably, for now, the biggest security threat is when agricultural water is tapped. About to be that countries find ways to cooperate over water but that water could exacerbate conflicts. See the 2012 Global Water Security report produced by US intelligence agencies (http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/pressreleases/96-press-releases-2012/529-odni-releases-global-water-security-ica, last accessed January 9, 2013).
whether there is a human right to water. There has been an intense debate about this topic in recent years. Lawyers and social scientists have discussed whether international law generates such a right, what precisely it would mean, and what difference it could make (perhaps for the better, by promoting development or by preventing excessive privatization, or perhaps for the worse, by wrestling control over water from indigenous peoples or by preventing appropriate privatization). Philosophy comes late to this debate. But if we are to accept a human right to water, it must have solid normative foundations. Before turning to that subject, let me say a bit about the legal and political situation that provides the background to our inquiry.
Legally and politically a human right to water has become increasingly recognized, its The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of waterrelated disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements.
General Comment 15 discusses extensively what a human right to water amounts to, and what its
corresponding duties are. In July 2010, the UN General Assembly (resolution A/64/292) recognized rights to water and sanitation. In September 2010, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution acknowledging that both rights are implied by the right to an adequate standard of living. The Council had earlier appointed an Independent Expert (later Special Rapporteur) on Sanitation might appear less worthy a subject for a human right than drinking water.
However, water for drinking and water for sanitation come from the same water system around us. We are highly vulnerable to water: there are waterborne diseases humans catch from dirty water, water-scarce diseases stemming from insufficient access, water-based diseases originating from organisms that live in water, and water-related diseases spread by animals that live near water. Poor sanitation is causally related to all these hazards. Moreover, the drinking of water and the disposal of urine and feces belong to the same metabolic cycles for which water is so essential. Two thirds of our bodies consist of water, and a right to safe drinking water makes sure we receive enough safe water for resupply. A right to sanitation guarantees that conditions allow for the safe disposal of human waste, which to some extent just is contaminated water but also involves water as a medium.
2. Let us turn to the philosophical debate. This section offers an overview. Economic and social rights enable individuals to participate actively in community life and to be competitive in commercial life by providing them with some substantive (often material) prerequisites to those ends (education, food, housing, social security, private property, etc.). A human right to water
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For the legal discussion, see Dubreuil (2006) , Staddon et al (2012 ), Winkler (2012 , Riedel and Rothen (2006) , Murthy (forthcoming) and Thielboerger (forthcoming). See also Gleick (1999) and Albuquerque (2012) . On global waters politics and governance issues, see Dobner (2010) . On General Comment 15, see Riedel (2006 ), Tully (2005 and Langford (2006). Perhaps we should take it at face value that major human rights treaties ignore water: water was not supposed to become part of the international responsibilities associated with human rights. This stance was taken, for instance, by the Canadian government (Craven (2006) ). Another possibility is that the framers of those documents took the availability of water for granted. Water conflicts are more prevalent now than when those dry, we know the n account of population increases and climate change, water conflicts have come to stay. Here we will not be further concerned with exploring why water appears so rarely in human rights documents and with other issues of legal interpretation that arise in this context. would be among these rights. Two questions arise: whether there are such rights at all, and if so, whether a right to water is among them. There is hardly any philosophical discussion about a human right to water itself. 6 But there has been much discussion about whether economic and social rights count as human rights. Some philosophers insist it is in light of general features of rights that such (alleged) rights are of the wrong sort to be human rights. Despite the significance of water for life, there could then be no human right to water. Section 3 rebuts these reservations.
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To be sure, this rebuttal only shows that there could be such rights, not that there are.
And if there are, one still needs to argue that a human right to water is among them. One may wonder, for instance, how such a right bears on practical choice, say, how it can be consistent with markets for water and sanitation. Or perhaps such a right would be unduly specific. Why proclaim it when we have a right to an adequate standard of living? Does this presuppose a judgment about priorities among the components of wellbeing that we may want to avoid?
There is also an inflation worry: do we devalue the currency by declaring too many rights?
Finally, one may think there is something about water that should detach it from the international responsibilities associated with human rights (especially on the account we will use in the present study). To argue that there are economic and social rights in general and a human right to Sultana and Loftus (2012) also discuss philosophical issues.
Most philosophers of human rights, like most practitioners, now accept that such rights are human rights although the precise list of such rights is debatable. To mention a few, Beitz (2009 ), Caney (2006 ), Cohen (2004 , Griffin (2008 ), Miller (2007 , Nickel (2007 ), Pogge (2002 , Sen (2009 , Talbott (2010 ), Waldron (1993 ), all do. Shue (1980 offers a classic argument to the effect that the enjoyment of any rights presupposes both basic civil and political rights (a basic right to physical security) and basic economic and social rights (to subsistence). Even Rawls (1999) , who only accepts a fairly limited set of human rights, acknowledges at least a right to subsistence. Main voices of resistance have included Maurice Cranston (1973 ) and Carl Wellman (1995 . See also Williams (2005) and ost outspoken opponent among practitioners is Aryeh Neier ((2012) , chapter 3).
water specifically we need an actual account of human rights that delivers such rights.
There are economic and social rights, and there are human rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation according to the conception of human rights as membership rights in the global order I have recently presented (Risse (2012a) (2005) formulates a worry specifically for labor rights:
The [E]ven if governments accept some responsibility for levels of employment, it may not be possible for them to provide or generate work, and if they fail to do so, it is not clear that the best thing to say is that the rights of the unemployed have been violated. Since in many cases governments cannot actually deliver what their peoples are said to have a right to, this encourages the idea that human rights represent merely aspirations, that they signal goods and opportunities which, as a matter of urgency, should be provided if it is possible. But that is not the shape of a right. If people have a right to something, then someone does wrong who denies it to them. (p 64) If there is a right and it is not satisfied, Williams says, then someone has done wrong. If someone does wrong, then that agent has the power to make it the case that the right was satisfied. But no one has the power to make it the case that, in this example, everyone has the opportunity to 9 http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en 10 For nuanced discussion of these matters, see also Beitz (2009), 161-174; see also Sen (2009), 379-385, and Pogge (2002) , 67-69. See also Griffin (2000) .
work. Therefore there is no identifiable duty-holder, which goes to illustrate that economic and social rights generally do not possess a vital feature of rights.
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The crucial response to the Nature-of-Rights objection is that human rights can sensibly be aspirational.
12 Aspirational rights are rights one can only progressively realize but that do not thereby forfeit their status as rights. A human right to X is a moral demand that X be realized if it is possible to do so, and that appropriate steps towards the creation of conditions be taken under which X can be realized if that is not possible right away. The obvious worry is that this response renders rights indistinguishable from mere goals (which may be desirable but do not impose duties on particular agents). But it does not. Even rights one cannot realize immediately have corresponding duty-bearers with the ability to contribute to the realization of the right and with relevant connections to the holder. The manner in which duty-holders should contribute is by way of helping to create circumstances under which the right can then later be realized. The UDHR itself is to some extent a teleological document, aimed at a progressive realization. As the Chilean delegate to the drafting committee, Santa Cruz, stated:
(1999), p 162).
We can distinguish between strict human rights, whose more or less immediate realization can be expected, and aspirational says), which can be realized only progressively (but also must be so realized). Contrary to Williams, it is possible for (aspirational) rights to be currently unsatisfied and yet for nobody to have done anything wrong. Which rights are strict and which aspirational varies by country, changes over time, and is contested. What bears on the distinction and thus on what is --is both resource limitations and political obstacles. There is much potential for political abuse of the space created by the idea of aspirational rights for disagreement about who needs to do how much towards the realization of certain rights. But this does not undermine the conceptual possibility of aspirational rights.
Strictly speaking (in my view of human rights, see below), the duty holder is always the global order as such. We must then determine which entities in the global order must do what towards the realization of the rights in question.
and aspirational ones, as appropriate. The international community has a duty to defend strict rights by intervening as appropriate if the government fails. The global order must aid governments that need assistance, intervening as appropriate if countries refuse to make efforts toward realizing aspirational rights. As René Cassin, a drafter of the UDHR, said about that 6). But there is progress: the sheer articulation of human rights standards is an expression of global concern. Human rights are a source of moral progress partly because discourse about them renders unavoidable the question of who needs to do what. One may worry that within states it would be unsatisfactory to claim that, say, some constitutional rights are for future realization, and if so, the same applies to human rights. But this objection assumes that the context in which a right to X is held does not matter for what is involved in there being such a right and in being a duty-holder. We are primarily used to (legal and moral) rights that hold within states. Those rights are plausibly linked to rather immediate realization. But it is not true that such rights are rights to begin with (among other reasons) because they are readily realizable. It is the other way round: they are readily realizable because state power has a certain nature, and so rights that hold within states can be conceptualized in this way. Human rights, in my view, hold within and against the global order. It is because of the differences between states and the global order that it might be problematic for rights guaranteed by constitutions to be aspirational, but not for human rights. There is always a link between rights and duties, but what precisely it is depends on the context in which the rights are held.
14 A second objection to counting economic and social rights as human rights is the Inferior-Urgency objection. If X is a human right, then it is no less urgent than any other human right. Economic and social rights are less urgent than some other rights that everyone accepts are human rights. Therefore, economic and social rights are not human rights. Maurice Cranston (1973) argues that economic and social rights f plendid thing economic and social rights were also realized. Yet it would be much more serious if civil and political rights were disregarded than if economic and social rights were.
14 For Pogge (2002) and (2000) all human rights are strict because the lack of fulfillment of basic economic and social rights is a function of how the global order operates, a failing that should and could be remedied immediately.
One way of understanding what is at stake is that civil and political rights are said to be more essential to survival than economic and social rights. But that point is misguided. Civil and political rights provide security, while economic and social ility to make a living. That ability is as essential to survival as security. Therefore some economic and social rights must be of as paramount an importance as some civil and political rights. A second understanding of what is at stake is that there is greater urgency in the provision of civil and political rights than in the provision of social and political rights, in the sense that satisfying the former can be more readily expected of duty-holders than satisfying the latter. The rationale is that civil and political rights are negative rights: they merely require that duty-holders refrain from inflicting harm. Economic and social rights are positive: they require measures to supply rights-holders with something. Not harming is more significant than doing good.
But first of all, just about every right involves positive and negative elements. The right to a fair trial is a classic civil right. A negative component of this right is that the state does not abuse its power by way of prejudicing court proceedings. A positive component is that states must take measures to create a judicial infrastructure in which fair trials are normal. The point applies to civil and political rights generally. Abstaining from abuse is always one aspect of what it is for such a right to be realized. But in addition, the state must take measures to make sure officials are trained and supervised in such a way that they do not abuse their powers. Economic and social rights often require the provision of material benefits to people, or the creation of opportunities that allow them to secure these benefits. But there is also a requirement that others refrain from interfering with individuals as they go about doing so. The division of rights into negative and positive ones is misleading.
A second reply to the Inferior-Urgency objection is that even if there were a difference in urgency between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and social rights on the other, this difference would not preclude any kind of right from being human rights. Buck (1998) . For left-libertarianism, see Vallentyne and Steiner (2000a) and (2000b). original version of that thought made water essential. In the biblical Book of Genesis we read od was hovering over the waters (Genesis 1:2). Water further deeds. The Old Testament also mentions God as a giver of water. In Exodus 15, the Israelites are saved when God reveals a tree whose contact with available bitter water makes it sweet. However, when collective ownership of the earth was discussed in the 17 th century, it was not this idea of God as a giver of water, and thus the significance of water for life, that set the tone. Instead, the idea that water was abundant and worthless became prevalent.
Water appears three times in chapter V Second Treatise. He begins by stating that, by revelation and natural reason, the earth can be considered common property of all of humanity. The revelation is recorded in Genesis (1:26, and 9:2-3; see also Psalm 115:16). Locke explores how there can be private property of resources that were originally given to humanity in common. Each person owns her body, and thus her labor. When she labor with something that is commonly owned, this object is thereby appropriated. An apple becomes mine when I pick it. Everybody has a license to appropriate consent. One illustration for how things are removed from the common pool involves water:
Though the water running in the fountain be every s, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labor hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself. (Sec. 29) Next Locke introduces constraints on acceptable property acquisition. Nobody is supposed to acquire more than she can enjoy: nothing must be spoiled or destroyed. When land appropriation occurs initially, such acquisition would leave s. Again he illustrates the matter in terms of water:
No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same. Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of . common ownership in which the entity belongs to several individuals, each equally entitled to using it within constraints; and private ownership. Common ownership is a right to use something that does not come with the right to exclude other co-owners from also using it. If the Boston Common were held as common ownership when it was used for cattle, a constraint on by respect for other co-owners and the concern to avoid the infamous Tragedy of the Commons.
Yet if they held the Common in joint ownership, each use would be subject to a decision process to be concluded to the satisfaction of each co-owner. Joint ownership ascribes to each co-owner property rights as extensive as rights of private ownership, except that others hold the same rights: each co-owner must be satisfied on each form of use.
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The biblical story can be read in different ways, see White (1967) and Passmore (1974) , chapters 1 and 2.
Passmore ( 21 The core idea of common ownership is that all co-owners ought to have an equal opportunity to satisfy basic needs to the extent that this turns on obtaining collectively owned resources. This formulation, first, emphasizes an equality of status; second, it points out that this equality of status concerns opportunities to satisfy needs (whereas there is no sense in which each co-owner would be entitled to an equal share of what is collectively owned, let alone to the support of others in getting such a share, any more than co-owners of the Boston Common had a claim to such a share or to the support of others to obtain it); and third, it does so insofar as these needs can be satisfied with resources that are collectively owned.
To put this in standard Hohfeldian rights terminology, common ownership rights must rights (p 171). 22 To have a liberty right is to be free of any duty to the contrary, and obviously, common ownership rights must include at least rights of that sort; that is, co-owners are under no 20 ownership of anything.
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For detailed discussion, see Risse (2012a) Once we see how collective ownership of the earth generates membership rights in the global order, it is natural to turn around the direction of inquiry and explore whether there are other bases on which such rights could be held. There are indeed, such as the idea of common humanity (which to most readers will be more naturally tied to human rights than collective ownership). I have explored this elsewhere (Risse (2012a) , chapter 11). What matters now is this: using collective ownership for a derivation of membership rights generates two fundamental guarantees states and other powerful organizations must give, and whose realization is a global responsibility. First, they must make sure their power does not render individuals incapable of meeting basic needs; second, they must provide opportunities for individuals to lead a life at least at subsistence level. A good deal of work still needs to be done to get from these guarantees to a sizeable list of human rights. But if such guarantees exist, the dangers imposed on individuals through the existence of the global order are neutralized vis-à-vis the status of which individuals are ensured in virtue of their common ownership rights.
7. We can now harvest some important results about water. To begin with, my approach does deliver economic and social rights. In addition to ensuring that the power of states and other organizations is not used to render individuals incapable of meeting basic needs, such organizations must provide opportunities for individuals at least to meet basic needs. Everybody must have the opportunity to enjoy a minimally adequate standard of living, as far as food, clothing, and housing are concerned. But this reasoning merely delivers a small set of rights since we can derive only a requirement to protect ever However, we can adopt a broader understanding of what rights are entailed by our starting points. According to that reading, rights provide more robust protection. We are assessing what set of associative rights should protect a bundle of natural rights of vital importance, rights needed to ensure individuals can meet basic needs. But in the pre-institutional scenario where these rights hold, no agent is as powerful as the state. It is in light of the power of states and of the importance of the rights that are at stake that control mechanisms must be imposed especially on states to ensure us as co-owners prevails. The permanence and reliability of that protection matter critically. So we should adopt the broader view of what rights are entailed by our starting points that generates more robust protection.
Recall the first fundamental guarantee, that states must make sure their power does not render individuals incapable of meeting their basic needs. On a narrow reading, this standpoint does not deliver much beyond basic rights to life and physical integrity. On the broader reading, co-ownership status is not preserved merely if it so happens that states do not render individuals incapable of meeting basic needs. States must be bound to refrain from doing so. Their power must be limited so that they cannot simply elect to become abusive. Adding ideas of robustness responds to the nature of the state as an entity that (generically, ignoring phenomena such as failed states) is overwhelmingly more powerful than individuals and organized in complex ways that permit abuse in many forms. Ensuring that individuals are robustly protected in light of the dangers posed by the state system requires such constraints although we cannot achieve perfect protection. To rights to life and bodily integrity we must add individual liberties (e.g., freedom from forced labor, of conscience, of expression and association, of movement, and freedom to emigrate), as well as political rights (e.g., to accountable representation), and due process rights (e.g., a fair trial).
The second fundamental guarantee is that states must provide opportunities for individuals to lead a life at least at subsistence level. On a narrow reading we merely obtain a set of rights that protect ty to live at subsistence level, such as rights to food, clothing and housing. But here too a broader understanding is available that generates a more robust set of rights. At least in societies with sophisticated economies that make it difficult to satisfy needs without actively participating in society, an elementary right to education and a right to work understood as a right not to be excluded from labor markets can be supported within such societies. Such rights constitute robust protection of the rights to food, clothing and housing that the narrower understanding already delivered.
Without water humans cannot survive. Therefore this must include a right to safe drinking water. According to the more robust understanding such a right includes a claim to enough safe drinking water to be an active member of society. Given the present understanding of human rights, it is then up to the global order to distribute the global water resources accordingly, and to assume a shared responsibility to develop local infrastructures to assist with accessing and distributing water. If people find themselves without water and their state cannot help, other agents in the global order must either make sure they have water or else allow them to move elsewhere. States can exclude people, and thus restrict their liberty right, only if they jointly give guarantees to people wherever they live. Since even minor deficiencies in our supply with safe water can seriously debilitate human beings, this guarantee must include safe drinking water.
Section 2 recorded some concerns about a right to water: that we would have to assess how such a right bears on practical choice, that is, how it may be compatible with markets for water; that it may be too specific and presuppose a problematic judgment about priorities among components of wellbeing; that we may devalue the currency by proclaiming too many rights; and that there may be good reasons not to tie water to international duties. As far as the first point is concerned, a right to water has often been enlisted to resist privatization of water resources. For instance, in the late 1990, the Bolivian government sought to improve the provision of municipal services by, among other things, privatizing water services. To cover their investments the companies involved raised the price of water substantially. In the city of Cochabamba these measures encountered such heavy resistance that the government ultimately undid the changes.
During these protests several grassroots organizations issued the Cochabamba Declaration according to water is a fundamental human right and a public trust to be guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be commodified, privatized or traded for commercial 26 But nothing in the account of human rights that we discussed licenses such a move. What the theory delivers is that a human right must constrain private markets to make sure everybody has access to enough safe water. This in turn implies that water has to be available at reasonable prices (prices that to do not interfere with other purchases required to maintain a decent life, and on which the original ownership status of the water exerts downward pressure). To be sure, the efficiency arguments that generally support markets also support them in the case of food and water. Markets facilitate the distribution of food and water and thereby help to make sure everybody has access to food and water at all. And although water occurs naturally, pipes do not.
Charging for treatment and delivery is appropriate. Nonetheless, fees must be kept at rates that do not interfere with the requirement that everybody have access to water at reasonable prices.
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The Cochabamba Declaration contrasts with an international statement, the Dublin Statement, published in 1992.
Issuing the first major recognition of water as a commodity, the governments represented at the 1992 International ). See Bakker (2012 for the relationship between a human right to water and privatization. See also Murthy (forthcoming), Dobner (2010 ), chapter 3, Bakker (2010 ), Chapter 5, and Barlow and Clarke (2002 . Related is also the issue of bottling water, private suppliers profiting from packaging natural resources, see Gleick (2010) .
The concern about over-specificity is toothless on account of the special status water has among nutrients. We must prioritize access to water as a component of wellbeing. The worry about rights inflation fails for the same reason. Finally, that there is something about water that makes it unsuitable for international duties is false. Precisely the opposite is true, and making that clear is one of the distinctive implications of resorting to my account of human rights in this context: there is a genuinely global responsibility for making sure everybody can enjoy access to water to which co-owners of the earth are entitled. The state system is acceptable only if it meets that responsibility.
A human right to sanitation also emerges, in any event on the more robust understanding of human rights that I just introduced. The basic thought behind the derivation of rights from collective ownership is that co-ownership generates entitlements to access to natural resources that must be either preserved or adjusted appropriately when individuals live in states. A right to water is an example of a right that preserves access to something to which individuals qua coowners must have access. A human right to basic education, for instance, adjusts for lack of access. Such a right applies at least in any slightly sophisticated society since the existence of states means that co-owners will often not have the possibility to make a living by accessing natural resources. As a substitute for this lack of access we need empowerment to participate in society. A right to sanitation involves both aspects (preservation of access to something to which co-owners must have access, and appropriate adjustment to life in states). It involves a guarantee to use the local water system, in this case for purposes of hygiene and thus for the maintenance of health. But such a right also captures an adjustment to life in societies where particular health hazards are generated or exacerbated through our organized ways of living together. Hygiene is an example of such a health concern. In a nutshell, there is human right to sanitation because co-owners are allowed to help themselves to naturally existing water systems to protect themselves against health hazards that to a large extent arise because of human living arrangements.
To put this point in perspective, let me add that a general human right to basic health care cannot be derived from collective ownership. Such a right is not necessary to neutralize the state to interfere with co-ownership. After all, access to such care does not turn on access to original resources as much as, say, sanitation does, but instead turns on human services and ingenuity. The basic thought for the derivation of rights from collective ownership mentioned at the beginning of the previous paragraph therefore does not cover a general human right to basic health care beyond a right to sanitation. As opposed to the human services and ingenuity that are at stake in a right to basic health care, human rights to safe drinking water and water is essential to all forms of life, and its existence is not owed to any human accomplishments. The state system interferes with the co-o basic needs by exericising their liberty right to water. Crucially, guaranteeing access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation becomes a genuinely global responsibility, a condition of the very acceptability of the state system, which on my account is characteristic of human rights. The particular theoretical set-up of this account is especially useful for showing that there is such a global responsibility.
8. There is more to say about water on my approach. For one thing, we can explore who has to make good on a human right to water. But we can also extend our horizion beyond the issues addressed by human rights. The vast majority of water is used for agriculture (upwards of 70%), followed by industry (say 15-20%) and then personal consumption (10-15%), of which drinking water is only a fraction. issues involve disputes over water for agriculture that are not covered by the (legal or moral) definition of human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation. Often these are questions of transboundary water allocation on which human rights provide little guidance, but which collective ownership also illuminates.
I focus mostly on obligations pertaining to the actual provision of water, rather than support that may be necessary to create infrastructure. However, we should notice that often physical water shortage is not the issue when people lack water for drinking and sanitation.
There is often enough water, but it is used for other purposes. Agriculture is frequently the only way for people (say, in rural Africa) to make a living, but water used for irrigation is unavailable for drinking needs. In such situations, a human right to water entails a duty to help with the provision of infrastructure to optimize use of water for agriculture or other essential purposes while also making sure there is enough water for drinking and sanitation. This situtation calls for a global compact on water, which must include a monitoring body. 27 This body would take inventories of global water resources and assess how they contribute to the overall value for human purposes of regions of the earth. It must identify which countries (a) under-use their regions and (b) are water-rich (on a per-capita basis). As far as the human right to water is concerned, it is in the first instance those countries satisfying conditions Let me end by describing why such a monitoring body would indeed face a difficult task.
It is vexing -if they also
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It is worth noting here that in 1997, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses (or Watercourse Convention). This Convention pertains to the uses and conservation of all waters that cross international boundaries (both surface and ground water). The Convention has three primary principles. First, states should able and -à-vis other states sharing that to co-riparian states. T co-riparian states and provide changes in use that could have significant, adverse effects on those co-riparian states. The Convention also outlines seven factors designed to ensure that an international watercourse is utilized in an bly, in the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys priority over other uses, but disputes about For this Convention, as well as for its legal context and possible implications for the case of Iraq, see Murthy (2010) . As of 2012, the Convention has not yet been ratified by enough countries to enter into force.
generally under-use resources can be expected to be the first to share water. More generally, it is vexing to determine how water contributes to the overall value of a region for human purposes. First of all, we must note the difference between water volume and yearly renewable supply. Countries might have a topography that creates lakes and a climate that prevents evaporation. For instance, Canada harbors 20% of the global water that is contained in lakes (Sprague (2010)). Based on that, one might wish to conclude that Canada should be among the first to be summoned when water is scarce elsewhere. Perhaps so, but one way of illustrating the intended impact of the remainder of this discussion is that it renders that kind of inference more problematic than it may seem. The renewable supply is the amount of fresh water that is fully replaced annually through precipitation. that example.) If the supply is gone, it will be replaced next year. If the volume is diminished, it may not be replenished. An assessment of the overall value for human purposes of regions of the earth must distinguish between these two manners of access to water.
A second complication is that humans are not the only water users. Collective ownership is a relationship among humans that is meant to capture that all of us have the same claim to resources and spaces. That relationship does not imply that other creatures should not also have an opportunity to consume resources, or that the preservation of ecosystems (of which hydrological systems are an essential component) does not by itself at least have aesthetic value that demands preservation. A third complication stems from the instrumental value of ecosystems. Wetlands and forests, for instance, play a critical role in purifying water. This kind of instrumental value of nature accrues mostly to the immediate environment. But ecosystems might also contribute to the cycle of transforming CO 2 into oxygen, a contribution to life everywhere on earth and not just where that ecosystem happens to be located.
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More work is needed to develop these ideas of a global water compact and its guiding idea of proportionate use of resources and spaces of the earth. Much of it is work in disciplines other than philosophy. Nonetheless, despite these complications, a global water compact that includes a monitoring body is required to make sure human beings have the kind of access to which they are entitled as co-owners. This relatively concrete result also mirrors our more 
